Th e view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Th inking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specifi c kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and fi nally by being a case of critical refl ection upon one's own thinking. It is argued that none of these properties of thinking introduce the necessity that the thinking subject has a language except for, probably, the last one. Th ere is reason to believe that the capacity to critically refl ect upon one's own thought requires internal verbalization of the thoughts being criticized. Th e view that emerges is that we might share larger parts of our cognitive phenomenally conscious life with non-linguistic creatures than is commonly assumed.
Introduction

1
Is it possible to think without language? Th e question is ambiguous. It might be read like this: (Q1) Is it possible for a creature without a language to think? (Can non-linguistic creatures think?)
While lying awake on the fl oor, a dog's changing facial expression and its eye movements may make it appear obvious that something is going on 1. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his or her very helpful critical remarks that motivated a number of modifi cations.
'in its mind'. Th e dog seems to think. But does it think and if so, in what sense? Or imagine a small child not yet capable of using a language. Th e child runs towards an object, suddenly encounters an obstacle, and stops. She looks around as if searching for alternative approaches. She hesitates, then runs around the table avoiding the obstacle, and fi nally reaches the desired object. Does the child think? In both cases the answer is, in my view, quite clearly positive. Non-linguistic creatures (small children and higher animals) are capable of thinking. In what follows, I will motivate this view. I will use 'thinking' in that context to designate occurrent mental processes. In thinking, certain contents are phenomenally present to the thinking subject. I take phenomenal presence of contents as a substantial common feature of all cases of occurrent thinking. I presuppose in what follows that there is something it is like to think, and that in thinking, certain contents are present to the thinking subject.
Th e question of whether or not it is possible to think without language has a second, quite diff erent reading: (Q2) Is it possible to think without thereby using a language?
In many cases we use language in our thinking even though we do not speak aloud. We then internally verbalize our thoughts. In verbalized thinking, thoughts are developed using specifi c sentences. One might wonder what exactly internal verbalization consists in and how its specifi c phenomenology may be adequately described. One might suspect that internal verbalization has something to do with auditory imagination. According to a simple proposal, internal verbalization is nothing but imagining hearing sentences with understanding. But a little refl ection shows that this is not right. One may imagine hearing a sentence with understanding and yet not thereby use the sentence to internally express one's thought. Internal use of language in thought is diff erent from imagining someone talking, and it is diff erent from imagining hearing a voice where the author is underdetermined in imagination.
Also, internal verbalization is not non-verbal thinking plus auditory imagination of an utterance of sentences. Rather, the thought is developed in verbalized thinking by 'internally producing sentences'. Maybe thinking is just like speaking without making noises. But what is it to speak without making noises? One might be tempted at this point to come back to the idea that thinking has something to do with auditory imagination, and one might propose that thinking in a verbalized way is imagining oneself
